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In April, 2010, the New York Times reported that President Obama had ―spoken 
disparagingly about liberal victories before the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1960s and the 
1970s.‖1  Obama  remarked  that  activist,  liberal  judges  of  that  era,  like  activist 
conservative judges today, ―ignored the will of Congress, ignored democratic processes, 
and tried to impose judicial solutions on problems instead of letting the process work 
itself through politically.‖2 The President uttered these remarks against the backdrop of a 
Roberts‘ Court campaign finance ruling that ended restrictions on corporate spending in 
elections3 - a decision that Obama publicly rebuked at a State of the Union address. 4 
Although some commentators expressed surprise at Obama‘s remarks, he had expressed 
a similar sentiment in a campaign book when he wrote, ―[i]n our reliance on the courts to 
vindicate not only our rights but also our values, progressives had lost too much faith in 
democracy.‖5 
The  sentiments  of  the  President,  a  former  professor  of  constitutional  law,  also 
 
  *  Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Justice Thurgood Marshall Distinguished Professor of Law and Professor of 
History at the University of Virginia. 
  1.  Charlie Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Says Liberal Courts May Have Overreached, N.Y. 
Times A15 (Apr. 30, 2010). 
  2.  Id. Many commentators interpreted the President‘s remarks as an endorsement of ―judicial restraint.‖ 
They understood Obama to imply that the precedents rendered by the  ―Warren and Burger courts - which 
expanded criminal defendant rights, required busing to desegregate schools and declared a right to abortion - . . 
. were dubious.‖ Id. See also Robert Barnes, Recent High Court Cases Revive Debate on Judicial Activism, 
Wash. Post A13 (May 3, 2010); Geoffrey R. Stone, President Obama and Judicial Activism, Huffington Post, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/president-obama-and-judic_b_561798.html  (posted  May  3, 
2010, 6:39 p.m. EDT). It is not clear to me that this inference is the correct one to draw. 
  3.  Savage & Stolberg, supra n. 1 (referencing the decision in Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 
(2010)).  
  4.  Id. 
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happen  to  reflect  perspectives  in  recent  scholarship  about  constitutional  law.  This 
scholarship,  all  written  by  highly  regarded  liberal  academics,  offers  a  skeptical 
assessment of federal courts‘ value as problem solvers of complex social and economic 
matters. The pessimistic appraisal is most clearly and most often associated with the 
claim that affirmative constitutional litigation in the U.S. Supreme Court offered bleak 
prospects - a ―hollow hope‖ - of fundamental social change.6 Scholars‘ calls for ―judicial 
minimalism‖7 and to take the constitution away from the courts8 strike a similar chord. 
A trio of recent books - Martha Minow‘s In Brown’s Wake: Legacies of America’s 
Educational Landmark, Paul Frymer‘s Black and Blue: African Americans, the Labor 
Movement, and the Decline of the Democratic Party, and Julie Novkov‘s Racial Union: 
Law, Intimacy, and the White State in Alabama, 1865-1954 - brings fresh perspectives to 
the study of how courts, political actors, and a range of institutions have contributed to 
the nation‘s current mix of inequality and opportunity. Like earlier commentators, these 
authors recognize that court-based change is not a reliable tool of problem solving. Yet 
they also offer nuanced appraisals of how courts fit into policymaking; they emphasize 
judicial competencies as much as deficiencies. These books perpetuate neither the image 
of the activist judge who can transform the world through political activism, nor the 
myth of the jurist who avoids politics and mechanically ―applies the law.‖9 Rather, these 
books  invite  readers  to  ponder  the  complex  and  interactive  ways  in  which  courts, 
lawmakers, and citizens move society forward, and push it back, toward an array of 
political outcomes. 
Martha Minow‘s book breathes new life into Brown v. Board of Education.
10 In 
Brown’s Wake persuasively argues that the legacy of the landmark decision extends far 
beyond race. Brown, Minow teaches us, spurred movements for equality under law and 
democracy  in  society  among  a  range  of  groups:  immigrants,  language  minorities, 
religious minorities, girls, gays, persons with disabilities, and the poor. Minow provides 
a  dazzling  array  of  examples  to  demonstrate  her  thesis  that  Brown‘s  democratizing 
impact extended far and wide. Indeed, this sprawling work traverses the domestic sphere 
and  considers  the  global  impact  of  the  landmark  case.  She  moves  seamlessly  from 
considering educational equality in Mississippi, Texas, and San Francisco, to pondering 
 
  6.  See Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 39-40, 74-75, 
93, 155-156, 336343 (U. Chi. Press 2nd ed., 2008); compare with Michael Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil 
Rights: the Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality 363–442, 463–468 (Oxford U. Press 2004). 
  7.  See Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Harvard U. 
Press 2001). 
  8.  Mark V. Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton U. Press 2000). 
  9.  All recent nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court have pledged fealty to some version of restrained 
judging, in which judges avoid activism. During his confirmation hearing, Chief Justice Roberts famously 
claimed that judges should merely ―call balls and strikes‖ rather than impose his own policy choices and 
preferred outcomes in cases. See Todd S. Purdum & Robin Toner, Roberts Pledges He’ll Hear Cases With 
‘Open  Mind’,  N.Y.  Times  A1  (Sept.  12,  2005).  In  a  similar  vein,  Justice  Sonia  Sotomayor,  during  her 
confirmation hearings, described her judicial philosophy as ―simple: fidelity to the law.‖ See Peter Baker & 
Neil A Lewis, Judge Focuses on Rule of Law at the Hearings, N.Y. Times A1 (July 13, 2009) A judge‘s task 
was not ―to make law‖ but to ―apply the law,‖ she said. Id. Sotomayor‘s statements describing her approach to 
judging occurred amid charges that she permitted politics and policymaking to play roles in judging; these 
charges were based, in part, on an address that Sotomayor delivered in which she referenced her ethnicity and 
gender (calling herself a ―wise Latina‖).Id.  
  10.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). BROWN-NAGIN.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)  1/28/2011 4:14 PM 
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the same issue in South Africa, Ireland, and the Czech Republic.11 
Brown has a rich legacy, but what has Brown wrought? Just the same as in the 
context of race and schools, the case‘s legacy is mixed - even contradictory - in the many 
other areas that it has touched. Practically speaking, courts, legislators, educators, and 
activists have translated the principle of equality in education for which Brown stands in 
a variety of ways, some of which are in tension with one another. Perspectives on what 
equality requires, permits, or encourages are inextricable from normative commitments 
about the thorniest social and educational policy issues of the day. The chief debate 
concerns a fundamental question: whether equality contemplates integration, or permits 
separation, that is, separate but equal education.12 
Minow  informs  us  that,  over  time,  Brown‘s  equality  principle,  construed  in 
different contexts and stretched to accommodate local needs, yielded inconsistent results. 
In many cities, students learn English through immersion programs, a form of language 
instruction  that  values  the  social  integration  of  English  language  learners  and  native 
speakers. But equality yielded bilingual schools catered to the cultural needs of Somali 
immigrants in the Twins Cities, a Hebrew language charter school in New Jersey, and 
Arabic  language  schools  in  New  York  City.  Advocacy  groups  for  persons  with 
disabilities harnessed Brown first to achieve integration, called mainstreaming in this 
context,  and  then  to  gain  specialized  instruction  in  separate  spaces.  Critics  of  New 
York‘s Harvey Milk High School for gay, lesbian, and transgendered students invoked 
Brown‘s equality norm in a bid to shut it down.13 
Minow‘s  discussion  of  the  reemergence  of  single-sex  education  in  American 
education is highly engaging. Despite the U.S. Supreme Court‘s decision requiring the 
historically all-male Virginia Military Institute to admit women, Minow notes, public 
single-sex schools may well pass constitutional muster in the future.14 Meanwhile, under 
the administration of President George W. Bush, federal law began to accommodate and 
even  encourage  the  growth  of  single -sex  schools  at  the  elementary  and  secondary 
levels.15 The number of single-sex classroom and charter schools has grown as a result. 
Feminists and civil rights leaders struggle to explain whether these development s are 
consistent with equality. 
Minow  highlights  one  reason  for  indeterminate  interpretations  of  equality  in 
education, whether among feminists who ponder the value of single -sex education or 
 
  11.  For the classic consideration of the geopolitical context of Brown, see Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation 
as a Cold War Imperative, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 61 (1988); more recently, see Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil 
Rights (Princeton U. Press 2000). 
  12.  The Brown lawyers aspired to integration, Minow argues, but the decision never mandated it; after a 
relative brief period of court-order desegregation, recent precedents have found school desegregation plans that 
take  race  into  account,  even  voluntary  plans,  constitutionally  impermissible.  See  Parents  Involved  in 
Community Schools. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).   
  13.  Martha Minow, In Brown’s Wake: Legacies of America’s Educational Landmark, ch. 3 (Oxford U. 
Press 2010). 
  14.  Id. at 68. 
  15.  Under Department of Education rules issued in 2006, it no longer is necessary for administrators to 
provide a comparable institution to students of the excluded sex. It is left to recipients of federal funds to assess 
whether single-sex schools are necessary to advance an important objective. See U.S. Dept. of Educ., Secretary 
Spellings Announces More Choices in Single Sex Education: Amended Regulations Give Communities More 
Flexibility  to  Offer  Single  Sex  Schools  and  Classes,  http://www2.ed.gov/print/ 
news/pressreleases/2006/10/10242006.html (released Oct. 24, 2006).  BROWN-NAGIN.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)  1/28/2011 4:14 PM 
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civil rights advocates who consider the value of school choice. Social science studies 
purporting to show educational benefits of various pedagogies that turn on integration or 
separation  have  not  painted  a  clear  picture.  Figures  on  all  sides  of  educational 
controversies use and misuse studies to justify their versions of school equity.16 
The nation‘s interest in accountability, demonstrated through a near-obsession with 
measuring  achievement  through  standardized  testing,  also  has  influenced  whether 
students of color, children with disabilities, English language learners, and others have 
the opportunity to learn alongside middle-class whites.17 Persistent racial achievement 
gaps on testing incentivize white flight from racially diverse schools. African-American 
and Hispanic students who attend schools where many students are impoverished suffer 
most when middle-class, white families flee from school system, Minow notes. These 
students of color are not disadvantaged because white students magically enhance school 
quality, she argues.  Rather, white middle-class students and families bring to schools 
access to social networks and intellectual capital that poor students and families typically 
do not posses, at least not at the same rates as the white middle class.18 
Paul Frymer‘s book, Black and Blue: African Americans, the Labor Movement, 
and the Decline of the Democratic Party, complements Minow‘s work by offering an 
analysis of intergenerational  economic  stasis,  union decline, and  their relationship to 
racial hierarchy in society - including in the schools. In just over 200 pages, Frymer, a 
professor of political science and legal studies who analyzes labor and civil rights from 
an institutional perspective, packs a powerful intellectual punch. Unlike some scholars in 
recent years, he argues that ―poor decisions and unwise tactics of labor leaders and their 
followers‖ do not explain the absence of a strong and racially diverse labor movement.19 
Instead, Congress‘ bifurcated legislative approach to labor and civil rights issues, along 
with ill-conceived institutional structure and design, explain the poor fortunes of workers 
in twentieth-century America. 
The  federal  government  split  questions  of  race  and  class  when  it  passed  the 
Wagner Act in 1935 and the Civil Rights Act in 1964, Frymer explains. According to 
Frymer,  these  two  legislative  acts,  accompanied  by  two  distinct  regulatory  agencies, 
separated the interests of blacks and labor and ―institutionalized the race/labor divide.‖ 
Civil  rights  historians  have  long  noted  that  the  Wagner  Act  permitted  racial 
discrimination. Frymer emphasizes a downside of civil rights activists‘ use of Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act to challenge systemic discrimination by labor unions. The courts 
integrated labor, but in the process, weakened the bargaining power of unions subject to 
lawsuits.  Meanwhile,  white  workers  fled  unions  and  the  Democratic  Party.  The 
Republican  Party,  fortified  by  racially  aggrieved  whites  and  union  members,  won 
elections and appointed members to the National Labor Relations Board who proceeded 
to further weaken the labor movement. Republicans on the EEOC also rolled back civil 
rights protections. With that, Frymer offers an ―autopsy,‖ as he terms it, of labor, civil 
 
  16.   Minow, supra n. 12, at ch. 6; see also id. at 141-143. 
  17.   Id. at 298-299. 
  18.   Ib. at 393-394. 
  19.   See Paul Frymer, Black and Blue: African Americans, the Labor Movement, and the Decline of the 
Democratic Party 2 nn. 5-8 (Princeton U. Press 2007) (citing Risa Lauren Goluboff, Robert Korstad, and 
Nelson Lichtenstein). BROWN-NAGIN.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)  1/28/2011 4:14 PM 
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rights, and the Democratic Party. 
While Frymer pushes back against scholars who, he asserts, heap blame upon the 
NAACP, labor organizations, and the workers themselves for their own misfortunes, he 
offers a provocative argument about public interest lawyers‘ roles in the decline of labor. 
He argues that civil rights lawyers‘ ―disinterest‖ in class-based rights arguments results 
in part from their ties to ―corporate power.‖ These lawyers represent clients ―pro bono,‖ 
but the organizations in question can only do so because they receive financial backing 
from corporate firms. Consequently, these lawyers are ―unwilling to confront economic 
power in any meaningful way.‖20 Frymer‘s observations, which are not accompanied by 
citations or names of organizations, appear to relate to the post-1964 period and recent 
events. He does, however, briefly reference Fortune 500 companies‘ backing of civil 
rights lawyers‘ strategies in the University of Michigan affirmative action cases as an 
example  of  this  phenomenon.  Frymer‘s  analysis  is  sobering.  It  calls  to  mind  earlier 
claims about conflicts of interest between civil rights and clients.21 
More of an effort ought to have been made to substantiate such a bold claim. The 
example  he  breezily  references  is  li kely  off  the  mark.  The  entity  that  Fortune  500 
Companies supported in the University of Michigan cases was the university itself,  a 
client represented by a private law firm.22 The university did not stand in for, or claim to 
represent, the interests of minority or working-class communities in the manner that the 
―civil rights‖ or ―public interest‖ bar did.23 In fact, as Justice Clarence Thomas noted in 
his  dissent  in  the  law  school  case, 24  the  law  school‘s  admissions  criteria  actually 
disadvantage minority and working class applicants; some commentators agreed.25 On 
this account, the Fortune 500 companies and the law schools‘ defense of  affirmative 
action  averted  a  discussion  of  the  systemic  inequalities  at  the  root  of  the  American 
educational system. In the University of Michigan cases, the conflict of interest analysis 
was not as straightforward as Frymer suggests. 
Nevertheless, Frymer‘s general point is very well taken: the prospect of corporate 
capture potentially imperils the public interest bar.26 But capitalists are not the only 
culprits here. Freymer is not keen to admit it, but the public interest bar and activists 
 
  20.  Id. at 7. 
  21.  See  Derrick  A.  Bell  Jr.,  Serving  Two  Masters:  Integration  Ideals  and  Client  Interests  in  School 
Desegregation  Litigation,  85  Yale  L.J.  470  (1976);  see  also  Tomiko  Brown-Nagin,  Race  as  Identity 
Caricature: A Local Legal History Lesson in the Salience of Intraracial Conflict, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1913 
(2003).  
  22.  Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 
Colum. L. Rev. 1436, 1463 (2005). 
  23.  Id. at 1467. 
  24.  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349-378 (2003). For an analysis of Thomas‘s opinion that 
elaborates on this point, see Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The Transformative Racial Politics of Justice Thomas?: the 
Grutter v. Bollinger Opinion, 7 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 787 (2005).  
  25.  Brown-Nagin, supra n. 20, at 1436; see also Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Comment: 
Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 113 
(2003); Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative 
Action, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 928 (2001). 
  26.  The more recent discussion of corporate power potentially undermining public service related not to 
civil rights lawyers but to the Congressional Black Caucus. See Eric Lipton & Eric Lichtblau, In Black Caucus, 
a Fund Raising Powerhouse, N.Y. Times A1 (Feb. 13, 2010); but see Marin Cogin, Congressional Black 
Caucus Rips New York Times Piece, Politico, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0210/33142.html (posted 
Feb. 18, 2010, 3:08 p.m. EST). BROWN-NAGIN.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)  1/28/2011 4:14 PM 
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themselves  always  have  made  hard  strategic  and  tactical  choices  -  ones  subject  to 
question  on  grounds  that  they  did  not  serve  the  best  interest  of  their  clients.  Future 
Supreme  Court Justice Louis Brandeis  - known as the  ―people‘s lawyer‖  - deployed 
stereotypes about women‘s capabilities in order to win protective labor legislation for 
women, and he eventually, he hoped, for the labor movement. His strategy succeeded in 
Muller v. Oregon, in  which  the U.S.  Supreme  Court  upheld a ten-hour  workday for 
women.27 Brandeis‘ advocacy helped to lay the foundation for the labor movement‘s 
demands for special protections on the job for all workers.28 At the time, some women‘s 
leaders  questioned  the  wisdom  of  Brandeis‘s  Muller  strategy  because  it  further 
embedded the notion of women‘s difference into constitutional law, in particular, those 
based on women‘s childbearing and childrearing capacities.29 The concept of women as 
the ―second sex‖ has been difficult to expunge from culture, and even from the law,30 
and some still contend that Brandeis‘ Muller strategy aided the resistance. Moreover, to 
this  day,  feminists  argue  about  the  wisdom  of  women  pursing  special  rights  or 
accommodations  in  the  workplace.31  Such  examples—when  lawyers  for  political 
movements make bold and controversial decisions that potentially damage their clients‘ 
interests—span groups and periods. If we limit ourselves to the twentieth century alone, 
the women‘s, civil rights, and antipoverty  movements illustrate the phenomenon. We 
need to embrace these fraught moments in the history of public interest lawyering, where 
advocates encountered difficulties in interactions with their own clients, not to mention 
the  courts  and  legislators.  They  are  teachable  moments  for  scholars  who  study  how 
advocates use the law to seek change, and for change agents themselves. 
Julie  Novkov‘s  book,  Racial  Union:  Law,  Intimacy,  and  the  White  State  in 
Alabama, 1865-1954, tackles different subject matter from the other two selections, and 
adds a distinct dimension to the study of law, politics, and racial hierarchy. Novkov, a 
political  scientist,  studies  the  ―political  development  .  .  .  of  racial  orders‖  and  the 
―institutionalization of white supremacy‖ at the state level.32 She considers Alabama‘s 
criminalization of interracial marriage and corresponding court battles to enforce and 
overturn bans against ―miscegenation‖ in order to explain how the law ―embeds‖ cultural 
and racial subordination. Novkov‘s abstract rhetorical frameworks, including references 
to  ―racial  formation,‖  ―racial  orders,‖  and  ―culturally  constructed  elements  of 
hierarchies‖ in the political development of states, will be familiar to specialists, if not to 
 
  27.  208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding statute limiting woman‘s workday in factories to ten hours per day on 
grounds of women‘s inferior physical capabilities and childbearing and childrearing functions). 
  28.  Melvin Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis: A Life ch. 9 (2009). 
  29.  See e.g. Monica Diggs Mange,  The Formal Equality Theory in Practice:  The Inability of Current 
Antidiscrimination Law to Protect Conventional and Unconventional Persons, 16 Colum. J. Gender & L. 1, 26-
28 (2007).  
  30.  Id. The most obvious example of a law that accommodates women‘s difference in the way that some 
find  problematic  is  The  Pregnancy  Discrimination  Act,  42  U.S.C.  §  2000e(k)  (1982)  (providing  that 
employment  discrimination  on  the  basis  of  ―pregnancy,  childbirth,  and  related  medical  conditions  is  sex 
discrimination for purposes of that Act.‖). 
  31.  See  Wendy  Williams,  Equality’s  Riddle:  Pregnancy  and  the  Equal  Treatment/Special  Treatment 
Debate, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 325, 354 n.114 (1984-85); . 
 Mary F. Radford, Wimberly and Beyond: Analyzing the Refusal to Award Unemployment Compensation to 
Women Who Terminate Prior Employment Due to Pregnancy, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 532, 606-608 (1988). 
  32.  Julie Novkov, Racial Union: Law, Intimacy, and the White State in Alabama, 1865-1954 5 (U. Mich. 
Press 2008). Novkov‘s approach borrows from the theory of Desmond King and Rogers Smith. Id. at 5-6.   BROWN-NAGIN.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)  1/28/2011 4:14 PM 
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a wider audience.33 
The  most  noticeable  and  welcome  feature  of  Novkov‘s  work  is  how  well  it 
captures dynamism in the law. Burns v. State,34 an 1872 decision, provides the jumping 
off point for Novkov‘s discussion of state building through the regulation of interracial 
intimacy.  In  Burns,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Alabama  overturned  state  legislation 
criminalizing  interracial  marriage  on  grounds  that  it  violated  federal  law  (the  Civil 
Rights  Act  of  1866).35  From  that  point  forward,  however,  the  state  contested  the 
decision,  including  in  its  1901  constitution.  The  constitution,  organized  around  the 
principle of white racial purity, forbade the legislature to permit interracial marriage, as it 
threatened the white racial order.  The state regulated miscegenation on grounds that 
marriage, or more particularly, the families that constituted them, were fundamental 
elements of the public order. Alabama jurisprudence developed in ways that defined and 
rationalized the white family as the primary organ of the state. The idea of an interracial 
family was a ―logical and legal‖ contradiction in terms, according to Novkov.36 
The state punished miscegenation with two-to-seven year sentences in the state 
penitentiary, giving rise to the mountain of cases that comprise Novkov‘s study. Her 
impressive database consists of all reported miscegenation cases in Alabama from 1865 
to 1970. (The U.S. Supreme Court‘s 1967 decision in Loving v. Virginia finally felled 
criminal  prosecutions  of  miscegenation  in  Alabama  and  elsewhere).37  Among  other 
things, Novkov‘s discussion informs  us that litigation over interracial sex bans often 
turned on questions of racial integrity; it reinforced a binary racial order, one into which 
―mulattoes‖ and Native Americans did not easily fit.38 Defendants could argue that no 
offensive sex had occurred because the accused had not mated across racial boundaries; a 
defendant could claim a defense of whiteness, that is.39 It comes as no surprise that 
relationships between black men and white women dominated the law reports; the state 
placed few burdens on white male access to black women. 
Novkov  hopes  to  offer  lessons  about  race,  gender,  law ,  and  the  state,  and  a 
nuanced  discussion  of  on-the-ground  developments  related  to  interracial   intimacy 
emerges in her work. She is convincing on the point that projects like hers, focused on 
the state as opposed to the national level, have much to tell us. That said, most would not 
argue with the proposition that state actors in post -bellum Alabama embraced white 
supremacy. Novkov‘s case-by-case survey of anti-miscegenation litigation in the state 
after  1865  shows  us  the  stages  of  the  process.  As  important  as  her  contribution  is, 
Novkov‘s work could have been bolder. I wondered about the relative utility of bans 
against interracial intimacy to the institutionalization of white supremacy, as compared 
to peonage, disfranchisement, or Klan violence, for instance. Novkov‘s work might have 
 
  33.  Id. at 5-6, 12-13. 
  34.  48 Ala. 195, 198-199 (Ala. 1872). 
  35.  Id. 
  36.  Novkov, supra n. 30, at 16, 44-48, 53-54.  
  37.  Id. at 271-275, 282. 
  38.  Id.  at  108-147;  cf.  Ariela  Gross,  What  Blood  Won’t  Tell:  A  History of  Race  on  Trial  in  America 
(Harvard U. Press 2010). 
  39.  Defendants asserted ―property in whiteness.‖ See Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1707 (1993); see also Novkov, supra n. 30, at 118-119. BROWN-NAGIN.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)  1/28/2011 4:14 PM 
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benefited from considering just how crucial bans against interracial intimacy were to 
white supremacy.40 
Novkov  concludes  by  speculating  about  whether  her  study  of  bans  against 
interracial marriage can enlighten contemporary discussions about same-sex marriage. 
While this discussion surely will distract readers who might prefer to draw their own 
conclusions from her careful analysis, Novkov, a political scientist, could hardly resist 
the pull to explore this live controversy. 
All three works echo one point that Novkov makes in this discussion. Opponents 
of same sex marriage uniformly disclaim animus as a basis for their position, and courts 
that  rule  against  recognition  of  same -sex  marriage  see  the  existing  order  as   ―pre-
political‖ or ―natural.‖ Each author emphasizes how certain inequities - in schools, in the 
economy, or in state construction of marriage and family relationships - are naturalized. 
Yet, the losers in the natural order are the ―perennial losers,‖41 subjects of discrimination 
and stigma historically and presently. 
II 
All of these authors bid readers to engage with inequality - not only because it is 
the just thing to do - but also because stratification costs all of us. A single sentence in 
Novkov‘s  book  beautifully  captures  the  idea.  She  writes:  ―Forgetting  or  refusing  to 
remember, blinding ourselves to color, has consequences.‖42 Minow makes the thought 
more concrete. She claims that we all lose when society is balkanized; social integration 
is important to employers and to a well-functioning democracy. By changing how we 
talk about Brown‘s legacy - insisting that something was in it for virtually all of us rather 
than  only  for  a  narrow  interest  group  -  Minow  hopes  to  reinvigorate  the  ideal  of 
community despite differences.43 
Increasingly,  however,  social  scientists  emphasize  the  costs  of  diversity. 
Commentators claim that social cohesiveness decreases in diverse neighborhoods and 
schools.44 Some question whether diversity increases productivity in the workplace. 45 
 
  40.  Novkov mentions these other tools of white supremacist orders in passing. See Novkov, supra n. 30, at 
8. 
  41.  U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
  42.  Novkov, supra n. 30, at 2.  
  43.  Minow, supra n. 12, at 393, 396, 403-407. This discussion has been a theme of Minow‘s work. See 
Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law (Cornell U. Press 1991). 
  44.  See e.g. Robert D. Putnam, E. Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century, 
30  Scandinavian  Pol.  Stud.  137  (2007);  Lisa  Delpit,  Other  People’s  Children:  Cultural  Conflict  in  the 
Classroom (New Press 1996). 
  45.  See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost Benefit Analysis of the Business 
Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 Wisc. L. Rev. 795, 827, 841-853 (2005) (―[u]nless the 
effects of diversity are well managed, miscommunication, and interpersonal conflict may increase leading to 
lower productivity and ultimately lower performance on profit‖) (quoting Taylor Cox, Jr. & Carol Smolinski, 
U.S.  Dept.  Labor  Glass  Ceiling  Commn.,  Managing  Diversity  and  Glass  Ceiling  Initiatives  as  National 
Economic  Imperatives  (U.S.  Dept.  of  Labor  1994)  (available  at 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1119&context=key_workplace));  David 
Orentlicher, Diversity: A Fundamental American Principle, 70 Mo. L. Rev. 777, 799-800 n.120 (2005) (―To be 
sure, the limited empirical evidence that is available paints a mixed picture about the value of diversity in the 
workplaces‖); Briana L. Seagriff, Keep Your Lunch Money: Alleviating Workplace Bullying with Mediation, 25 
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These negative analyses and outlooks on social integration merit closer consideration. 
Frymer‘s institutional analysis of inequality directly confronts these negative sentiments 
about  diversity.  Whereas  equal  protection  jurisprudence  and  public  commentators 
discuss inequality in terms of individual bad motive - we ask, is he a racist? - 46 Frymer 
insists that readers focus on the idea that behaviors that create inequality  - racism, in 
particular - are not irrational. Rather, such practices are strategic; they facilitate access to 
or help maintain power, wealth, and prestige in institutions.47 
Either way, the question we might ask ourselves going forward is how we can 
promote  institutional  configurations  that  encourage  people  who  otherwise  are 
competitors for scarce resources to invest in integration. In what ways can whites learn to 
see that their fates are tied to that of people of color, and vic e versa? Minow‘s book 
mediates  on  this  matter  the  most,  yet  she  devotes  less  time  discussing  common 
understandings  of  equality  that  each  slice  of  the  larger  community  might  invoke 
productively. 48 
As I see it, four models emerge, and each has something to commend it, along with 
serious limitations. One approach is to place an emphasis on ―universal,‖ as opposed to 
targeted programs, such as race-specific programs, that have the potential to advance the 
interests of all. This, as President Obama has written, ―isn‘t just good policy; it‘s also 
good politics.‖49 Proponents of this approach advocate priorities such as universal health 
care, child-tax credits, living wages, charter schools, and other forms of school choice. 
Immediately  obvious  is  the  fact  that  so-called  universalism  does  not  avoid  the 
contentiousness associated with targeted programs. The policy arguments are a shade 
different, but no less contentious or partisan. 
A second and related approach emphasizes the building and fortifying of multi-
racial organizations and coalitions. Frymer notes that notwithstanding the decline of the 
labor movement, one third of it is represented by people of color, and there are more 
people of color in labor organizations than in any civil rights organization. 50 These are 
eye-opening facts. Nevertheless, organizations and coalitions, even diverse ones, in and 
of themselves, are not politically me aningful. Organizations must employ goals and 
processes that can achieve just results. This approach can only be an initial step, prior to 
negotiation and combat with external political actors. 
Third, some advocate discursive and educative practices and st rategic alliances 
within institutions to promote institutional restructuring 51 and ―racial literacy.‖52 For 
 
as  Accident,  74  Ind.  L.J.  1129,  1185  n.164  (1999)  (―There  simply  is  ‗no  systematic  proof  that  diversity 
management  programs  decrease  ethnic  and  gender  tensions  while  increasing  profits,  productivity,  and 
creativity.‘‖). 
  46.  Washington  D.C.  v.  Davis,  426  U.S.  229  (1976);  Charles  Lawrence,  The  Id,  the  Ego,  and  Equal 
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987); cf. Richard Thompson Ford, 
The Race Card: How Bluffing about Bias Makes Race Relations Worse (Picador 2009). 
  47.  Frymer, supra n. 18, at 108. 
  48.  Frymer is confident that ―almost anyone can be induced to follow orders or change his or her behavior 
in a specific institutional context, whether through simple peer pressure or an effort to follow structured rules.‖ 
Frymer, supra n. 18, at 127. 
  49.  Barack Obama, The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream 247 (Crown 
Publishers 2006). 
  50.  Frymer, supra n. 18, at 1-2. 
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example, school administrators must create ―cultures of achievement‖ for low-income, 
minority children and workplace managers must actively recruit diverse workers - across 
color, gender, language, and disability barriers - and show that they value their presence 
once they are in the workplace. These practices presuppose that people are willing to 
compromise across boundaries and learn, and they may well be; however, proponents 
must  develop  incentives  that  encourage  institutional  stakeholders  to  overcome  self-
interested behavior that underlies stratification. 
Fourth, some emphasize approaches that seek to break down boundaries through 
social, cultural, and interpersonal exchange across lines of race, class, gender, and the 
like.  Long-term,  these  methods  might  be  most  effective.  But  they  may  be  the  least 
susceptible  to  outside  influence  or  manipulation.  Consider,  for  example,  that  some 
commentators have suggested interracial marriage is the surest approach to ameliorating 
racial conflict in America. 53 This proposal might be correct, but no one would suggest 
that the state should promote interracial unions. 54 Or, take the less extreme example: 
interracial  friendships,  many  of  which  begin  in  neighborhoods  and  schools.  
Neighborhoods are segregated.  The U.S. Supreme Court has held that school districts 
cannot even voluntarily adopt school integration plans that might promote cross -racial 
exchange among school children.55 Increasingly, individuals themselves must initiate 
cross-boundary exchanges. That observation takes us back to the law, however, for all 
such exchanges take place within its shadow. 
III 
The courts‘ competence to address inequality roots each book‘s discussion. Each 
work, in its own way, permits us to question scholarly narratives that emphasize judicial 
incompetence and counsel judicial restraint. The authors do not, in the main, tell tales of 
judicial  heroism.  One  does  not  necessarily  come  away  from  these  readings  less 
pessimistic  about  the  courts.  But  the  combination  of  methodological  approaches 
employed  by  these  authors  makes  clear  the  variety  of  roles  that  courts  can  play  in 
movements for political and social movements for equality.56 
Minow‘s analysis of Brown‘s legacy emphasized breadth. For Minow, Brown has 
endured in hundreds of different ways, even as the U.S. Supreme Court itself has chipped 
away at the case‘s central premise as applied in the context of racial desegregation. 
Minow‘s work maps the variety of stakeholders responsible for implementing Brown‘s 
 
Deal, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 959 (1996) (discussing the need for a new paradigms for recruitment, selection, and 
promotion in order to enhance diversity); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: a 
Structural  Approach,  101  Colum.  L.  Rev.  458  (2001)  (suggesting  a  structural  regulatory  solution  to  the 
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Democracy (Harvard U. Press 2003). 
  53.  See  Michael  Lind,  The  Next  American  Nation:  The  New  Nationalism  and  the  Fourth  American 
Revolution 288-298 (Simon & Schuster 1996). 
  54.  Latest figures show that the number of interracial marriages has declined; some argue that economic 
distress is a factor in peoples‘ willingness to engage in exogenous marriage. Cf. Sam Roberts, Black Women 
See Fewer Black Men at the Altar, N.Y. Times A12 (June 4, 2010). 
  55.  Parents Involved in Community Schools, 551 U.S. 701. 
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norm of equality over time. Notably,  many of those people are legislators and other 
public  officials;  these  individuals  work  with  courts  and  with  awareness  of  judicial 
decisions,  not  autonomously.  This  is  true  even  when  political  rhetoric  suggests 
otherwise, as some of the school finance cases show; legislators claim to disfavor court 
mandates, but over time, school funding levels rise.57 Most recently, Brown has given 
rise to varieties of school choice; legal rules or standards established by courts long ago, 
or even present courts,  may  yet play a  large role  in determining  which  students  get 
access to this programming. 
Frymer‘s  analysis  emphasized  depth  in  several  institutional  contexts.  Far  from 
discussing judicial incompetence, Frymer portrays the federal courts as ―powerful and 
successful.‖58 Judges achieved their objectives of integrating labor unions; for Frymer, 
the second-order problems that occurred in the labor movement as a result of Title VII 
litigation did not undermine the fact of judicial success. Frymer‘s analysis also reminds 
us to consider all of the institutions in which lawmaking occurs, courts, Congress, as well 
as regulatory agencies. Again, courts are not autonomous, but interactive. 
Novkov offers an in-depth analysis of a single subject matter and state. Even as she 
concerns herself with how courts and law embed racism and inequality, Novkov stresses 
―openness in doctrinal development when legal institutions interact with social forces.‖59 
In  her  telling,  the  system  is  ―porous‖  to  culture,  political  developments,  and  legal 
argument.60  Moreover,  she  does  tell  a  story  of  judicial  success.  Loving  v.  Virginia 
effected fundamental social change. To be sure, timing was an important element of the 
decision‘s success, and enforcement was largely left to individuals rather than to state 
actors. Nonetheless, Loving doubtlessly represents a form of judicial success.61 
CONCLUSION 
Taken together, these three books, one from a law professor and two from political 
scientists, remind us that the analyses we offer about the law depend on our lens and our 
methodologies. It remains to be seen, however, whether public discourse about the work 
of the courts will ever become as nuanced as some of the scholarship. For now, it is 
fashionable  to  criticize  ―judicial  activism‖  and  praise  ―judicial  restraint,‖ 
notwithstanding the fact that these terms are easily manipulated. Meanwhile, judges are 
human; they operate in the real and dynamic world of modern constitutional law and 
they do not unerringly apply the same jurisprudential tools to each and every like case. 
Elected  officials  beacon  the  courts  to  strike  down  or  rewrite  statutes  through  faulty 
drafting, failure to address matters such as entrenched inequality, or by writing their 
prejudices and the preferences of special interests - including corporations - into the law. 
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The vaunted ―democratic process‖ lays the most controversial issues at the court‘s feet. 
I wonder what would happen if the American people had a more accurate picture 
of the courts and more realistic about the capacity of elected officials to address our 
thorniest social problems? Perhaps next on our agenda should be nuanced works about 
courts, politics, and inequality, like Minow, Frymer, and Navkov‘s – but written for a 
general audience. Such accessible and nuanced works might help to inspire the fresh 
rhetorical frames and public conversations about law and society that we need, for a 
change. 